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Empirical work relating trade liberalization and income distribution has identified an
important anomaly. The Stolper-Samuelson theorem predicts that trade liberalization will shifi
income toward a country’s abundant factor. For developing countries, this suggests liberalization
will principally benefit the abundant unskilled labor. Yet extensive empirical studies have identified
many cases with a contrary result. This paper develops a simple theoretical explanation for this
anomaly. It shows that countries which are labor abundant in a global sense may see wages decline
with liberalization if they are capital abundant in a local sense. The current absence of empirical
work that would allow us to identifi the relevant local abundance implies that virtually all assertions
regarding anticipated distributional consequences of trade liberalization are without foundation.
There may likewise be important implications for industrialized countries that border developing
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Trade liberalization by developing countries has held forth two promises. The first is that it
will raise aggregate income. A growing body of research indicates that this promise has been
fulfilled.’ The second promise is that the internal distributional consequences of liberalization will
be benign. The foundation for this promise is the celebrated Stolper-Samuelson theorem. In
simple terms, it says that trade liberalization will benefit a country’s relatively abundant factor.2
And most developing countries, when compared to the global economy, are relatively abundant in
unskilled labor.3
Yet the empirical evidence for this second promise is at best mixed. A ten-count~ NBER
study coordinated by Krueger (1978) and Bhagwati (1978) considered the issue, The latter
summarized the results as follows:
The functional distribution of income, while it can be strongly related to foreign
trade regimes in theoretical analysis (e.g. the familiar Stolper-Samuelson theorem),
does not appear to show anything like a strong and predictable relationship in the
Project studies. [p. 198]
Similar results are reported in a nineteen-country World Bank study coordinated by Choksi,
Michaely, and Papageorgiu (199 1). Having noted theoretical reasons that one might anticipate
improvements in the distribution of income, they conclude:
‘ See Sachs and Warner (1995), and Edwards (1993).
2Outstanding reviews of the extensive literature inspired by Stolper and Samuelson (1941)
appear in various contributions to Deardoff and Stem (1994).
3In Section 3 below we consider the case of more than two factors,
1These are all apriori arguments. What does the evidence show? Unfortunately, it
is mixed and fragmentary. In some cases . . the income distribution worsened
during the course of liberalization. In roughly as many others, . . . the reforms
improved the income distribution. But in most cases it is hard to be sure. [p. 55]
Results at odds with the Stolper-Samuelson suggestion appear in the important work of Robbins
(1996), whose study of seven countries in Latin America and East Asia showed that in almost all
cases the relative skilled to unskilled wage rose afier trade liberalization.4 Given the itiuence of
the Stolper-Samuelson perspective, these results qualifi as an important anomaly.
This paper develops a simple theoretical explanation for this empirical anomaly.5 It takes
as a central premise that the wide divergence in relative factor endowments precludes factor price
equalization (FPE) for the world as a whole. Once accepted, this forces a radical revision in the
conventional way of interpreting the Stolper-Samuelson result. Relative factor abundance of a
country continues to be central to predicting the Stolper-Samuelson consequences of trade
liberalization, However the reference set against which one measures relative factor abundance is
no longer the global economy. Instead, factor abundance matters only relative to a smaller set of
4A more complete summary of the World Bank study appears in Michaely, Papageorgiu,
and Choksi (1991). Similar conclusions were reached by Bourguignon and Morrisson (1991). For
the impact of the recent Mexican liberalization on relative skilled to unskilled wages, see Feenstra
and Hanson (1995), Feliciano (1996), and Cragg andEpelbaum(1996). Johnston (1995)
suggests, based on her study of Colombia, that some previous studies may have relied excessively
on data for urban areas.
5There are alternative theoretical paths one could pursue to obtain apparently anti-
Stolper-Samuelson results. These include considering factor intensity reversals, the Metzler
paradox, higher dimensions of factors, andDeardorff’s(1986) woefil FIRLESS FIRWOES. See
Bhagwati (1959) andEthier(1984). Feenstra and Hanson (1995) develop a clever approach to
explain the distributional impact of outsourcing on Mexico. It relies on capital movements to raise
the size of Mexico relative to the US, hence to shifi the marginal good to be more skill intensive.
This shifis the structure of relative demand for skill upward in both countries. It does not consider
the issue of which competitive margins are relevant, as in the present paper. The attraction of the
account developed here is its simplicity and the relevance of its key assumption.
2countries with similar endowment proportions.d A country can be very labor abundant when
considered within the context of the global economy, However, if it is capital abundant relative to
the countries within its reference set, the distributional consequences will be precisely opposite to
those one would anticipate with a more conventional interpretation of Stolper-Samuelson.
Nor are the consequences of these observations limited to the developing world. Recent
discussions of trade liberalization agreements between industrialized and developing countries, as
in NAFTA have focused on their potential impact on migration. In the simplest form, this has
involved the following logic: If wages for the unskilled rise in the developing country, then
migration will decline; trade liberalization will raise wages for the unskilled; therefore trade
liberalization will help to stem migration. The model developed in this paper makes clear that the
premise that liberalization will raise wages for the unskilled in the developing country is open to
question, and so correspondingly is the conclusion that migration will decline,’
s As will be developed below, the relevant reference set is composed of those countries
within the same “cone of diversification.” They have similar endowment proportions and produce
the same range of goods. Under free trade, and with identical constant returns to scale
technologies, there will be FPE among members of the same cone, but not between cones. See
Dixit and Norman (1980). This type of model was key to the theoretical approach of Krueger
(1977). It has also been used by Bhagwati (1984), who made it the centerpiece of his explanation
for the Kravis, Heston, and Summers (1982) observation that services are cheaper in poor
countries. Learner (1987) uses such a model to identifi differing “paths of development.” Learner
and Levinsohn (1995) have urged empirical researchers to investigate the multi-cone model more
closely, especially when (as in the present case) the problem of interest concerns both developing
and developed countries,
7Indeed the available empirical work on Mexico’s liberalization suggests that the unskilled
wage has fallen sharply relative to skilled wages, even prior to the foreign exchange crisis. See
Feliciano (1996). The lessons of the present paper are relevant to this experience, since the
sharpest change in Mexico’s trade policy was its autonomous liberalization prior to the NAFTA
agreement.
32 The Model
Consider a Heckscher-Ohlin world with many countries, three goods, and two factors.
Both goods and factor markets are petiectly competitive. Technologies are constant returns to
scale. For simplicity, assume they employ fixed coefficients, The two factors of production are
capital and labor, and are available within each country in fixed Supply.g The three goods are X, Y
and Z, in decreasing order of capital intensity, as reflected by kx > kY> kz. Each country is small
relative to the world economy, so may treat international goods prices as fixed independently of
its trade policy choices.
An important assumption is that cross-country endowment differences are too strong for
the world trading system to replicate the equilibrium of a filly integrated world economy in the
sense of Dixit and Norman (1980). Accordingly, factor prices are not equalized for the world as a
whole. The capital abundant countries will have the higher wage to rental ratio, ON> Us. This
framework is depicted in the well-known Lemer diagram in Figure 1.
aRecent discussions have focused on redistribution between skilled and unskilled labor,
One can simply substitute “skill” for “capital” to make this relevant for these discussions.
Alternatively, if capital is internationally mobile with an interest rate determined in the larger
world economy, it would be straightfomard to describe a three-factor model in which
observations of the skilled to unskilled wage corresponded very strongly with the results





Figurel Heckscher-Ohlin Without FPE
We assume that for all countries c, the endowment ratio F e (kZ, kx), and Y # kY, so that
all countries have diversified production. We will refer to the set of countries for which k ~ (kY,
kx) as the North, and that for which kc ~ (kz, kY)as the South. These endowment differences lead
countries of the North to produce orIIythe goods X and Y, and countries of the South to produce
goods Y and 2,9 That is, the world has two cones of diversification. The endowments of a
particular count~ maybe represented as a point within the cone that defines its region
[see Figure 2].
9Wood (1994) and Learner (1996) raised the issue of “non-competing” goods in their
discussion of the rising skill premium in the United States and United Kingdom. Here X is a non-
competing good for the North, as is Z for the South. Y is a competing good for each. The fact
that there is a good produced in common is not essential for the results here. The emphasis in
each of the papers noted above to the importance of non-competing goods is consistent with the
type of multi-cone, no-FPE model developed here.
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Figure 2 Diversification Cones
At this point we must consider a distinction that will prove crucial to our analysis of the
distributional effects of trade liberalization. Each North country is more capital abundant than any
South country. Thus we may sensibly call the North countries the capital abundant countries, and
the South the labor abundant countries, in a global sense. However, it turns out that this global
sense of factor abundance is not relevant for predicting the Stolper-Samuelson effects of trade
liberalization. Instead, what is crucial is the local factor abundance, i.e. within the count~’s cone
of diversification. We will make this more precise by considering the case of the South.
All countries of the South produce the same set of goods, Y and Z, However their trade
patterns vary depending on their relative factor abundance within the cone. These break down
into three cases, depicted in Figure 3.10All countries of the South must import X, since it is not
produced there, The most capital abundant of the South countries are those in region A. They
10This tripartite division invites the appellation “Neapolitan” cones, In higher dimensions
of factors, as seen below, this feature is preserved in cross section.
6produce a great deal of Y and very little Z. Accordingly, exports of Y are used to finance not only
imports of X, but also of Z. The least capital abundant countries are those in region A’, a
designation chosen to emphasize that the export patterns of A and A’ are complementary, 11Those
in A’ produce a great deal of Z, but very little Y. Accordingly, exports of Z are used to finance
not only imports of X, but also of Y. Those at an intermediate level of capital abundance, in
region M, satis~ their own needs for both Y and Z, and so export both in exchange for X.
Export hpO1’t
A: Y X,Z
K M: Y,z x
I ;X A’: Z X,Y
/
North /‘y
Figure 3 Varied Trade Patterns
of the South
We consider now the effects of trade liberalization for three countries representative of the
three regions of the South identified in Figure 3. Assume that each initially has in place a uniform
11Whenever we speak of two countries as having complementary export patterns, we
always mean relative to the set of goods produced within the cone. Such pairs of countries with
complementary trade patterns will figure prominently in our discussion in Section 3 below of the
case of more than two factors.
7d valorem tariff at rate t on all imports.12 Consider first the case of a representative country a
from South region A. The determination of factor returns can be examined in a diagram taken
from Mussa (1979), and appears as Figure 4,
w
I
Figure 4 Trade Liberalization in a Locally
Capital Abundant Country of the South
In the case of Leontief technologies, the zero profit frontiers are linear in factor price
space. An important insight for our results comes from the fact that Figure 4 does not feature the
zero profit frontier for the good X. We could place it in this space, but since country a (as all
countries of the South) does not produce X, the corresponding zero profit frontier plays no role in
the determination of factor prices. As a result, the elimination of protection on X which lowers the
domestic price of X in country a likewise has no influence on local factor prices. However,
fact that protection is eliminated on Z, lowering its domestic price, leads the corresponding
the
zero
12We assume that the country’s tariff is at a level that leaves the qualitative pattern of
exports and imports unchanged from that under a regime of free trade.
8profit frontier to shifi in. The exportable Y remains at the fixed world price, so experiences no
shifi in the zero profit frontier. The equilibrium of country a shifis from EOto El in Figure 4.
Trade liberalization in country a has lowered wages and raised rentals. This occurs in spite
of the fact that it is capital poor and labor rich in the global sense (since it is a member of the
South). The crucial element is that it is capital abundant in the local sense, i.e. within its own
cone. It is also important to realize that not a word has been said about the volume of trade
between country a and its various trading partners. The reason is that the volume of trade plays
no role in the determination of factor prices, hence the purely distributional consequences of
liberalization, 13 Thus our results here would not be affected even if a large majority of the trade
of this country is with the North.14
It is straightfonvard to replicate this experiment for countries of the South in regions M
and A’. In the case of a count~ from region A’, we will get the more conventional result that
trade liberalization will raise wages and lower rentals, Yet this occurs for an unconventional
reason. Trade liberalization raises wages for a country in region A’ because it is labor abundant
within the cone of the South, not because of its labor abundance relative to the North. Finally, in
13As pointed out by Bhagwati (1959), an analysis of distributional effects should also take
into account the manner in which government tariff revenues are distributed. We abstract from
this by assuming that government revenues are distributed to factors in proportion to their share
of market income. In this case, and with endowments fixed, the wage to rental ratio is sufficient to
describe the distributional shares.
14Of course, changes in trade volumes will matter a great deal for the overall welfare
consequences of the liberalization. For small movements in the tariff, these effects are given by the
classic formula dV = - m dp* + t dm, The first term is zero because of the small country
assumption, leaving only aggregate gains from the rise in trade volume with liberalization.
9region M, income distribution is entirely unaffected by the removal of protection, since the zero
profit frontiers for the two exportable do not shift.
Using these results, we can depict the impact of trade liberalization on the wage to rental




Figure 5 Impact of Trade Liberalization on
the Wage to Rental Ratio
An interesting comparison emerges with respect to the most labor abundant countries of
the North and the most capital abundant countries of the South. They share a common trade
pattern, exporting Y for imports of X and Z, Nevertheless autonomous trade liberalization has
exactly opposite consequences for the two. Yet more curiously, it raises wages for the country of
the North, and depresses them in the South, in spite of the fact that the North countries we are
examining are more capital abundant than the South countries. The reason, again, is that this
direct (global) comparison of factor abundance is irrelevant for the Stolper-Samuelson effects of
trade liberalization. What is crucial is the local factor abundance, relative to one’s own cone, and
correspondingly the product mix relevant in determining local factor prices.
103 Generalizations
Thus far we have worked with a highly simplified two-factor model. Yet empirical
research often invites an extension of the list of factors to include land and other resources, as
well as to distinguish between qualities of labor. Thus it is important to know how our results
generalize when we include more factors of production, 15
There are two principal results whose robustness we would like to confirm. One is that a
country’s factor abundance relative to the global economy is irrelevant for predicting the
distributional consequences of liberalization -- instead one needs to know the abundance within
that country’s production cone. This is a subtle problem, since with more than two factors we no
longer have a scalar ordering of relative abundance. lbNonetheless, the essential point from the
two factor case is robust. All and only those countries strictly within a specific cone share a
common set of zero profit conditions under free trade. And the pattern of exports and imports of
these goods, hence the relative price movements to be expected under liberalization, depends on
15It is well known that when one moves to higher dimensions the one-to-one mapping
between the price of a specific good and the qualitative impact on a particular factor is preserved
only under special conditions [see the excellent discussion in Ethier (1984)]. However, as
evidenced by the brilliant paper of Learner (1987), it is possible to move beyond the two factor
setting and relate these links between goods prices and factor returns to interesting features of
economic structure. Learner’s paper likewise illustrates that adding more factors poses no
problem for the existence of the cones of diversification which are the premise of the present
study
16It would be straightfo~ard in Learner’s (1987) three factor framework to provide an
example in which one country had both more capital and more land per worker than a country in
another cone, but in which trade liberalization raises wages in the former and lowers them in the
latter. The key, of course, would be their endowments -- so export pattern -- within their
respective cones. This corresponds to the comparison of the locally labor abundant North country
with the locally capital abundant South country in Section 2 above.
11the composition of a country’s endowments within the cone. Moreover, since as we show below,
members of a single cone can have precisely opposite distributional consequences of liberalization,
it is clearly impossible for any ordering across different cones to provide interesting contrasts
regarding qualitative changes in factor returns.
The second result whose robustness we want to check concerns the structure of the
distributional consequences of liberalization within a cone. In the two factor case, there is a region
of endowments in which all locally produced goods are exported, so that trade liberalization has
no distributional consequences. In addition, there is a pair of regions with complementary trade
patterns, for whom the distributional consequences of liberalization are precisely reversed.
When we move to cases with more factors, the essential structure is very similar. There
remains a single region in which liberalization has no distributional consequences. The one
significant change is that now there is more than one set of paired regions. 17One observation
serves as the foundation for this assertion. Within the cone, and under balanced trade, there exist
regions of endowments that support every combination of exports of the goods that define the
cone. Ttis always includes the case in which all locally produced goods are exported. Beyond
this, the regions break down into pairs, with export patterns that are complementary relative to
the set of locally produced goods. Since our experiment concerns small countries reducing a
uniform ad valorem tariff, there will be no relative price changes within export- and import-
competing goods respective y, so each can be aggregated. It is clear then that trade liberalization
by countries in paired regions is affecting ordy a single relative price of locally produced goods.
17For example, in the three factor world there will be three sets of paired regions in a
cone, as well as a single region in which all goods are exported.
12And because their export patterns are complementary, liberalization moves this price in opposite
directions. Thus, whatever the distributional consequences of trade liberalization of a country in
one region, we know that for a country in the paired region they will be precisely reversed.
4 Conclusion
This paper has developed a simple model to consider the impact of trade liberalization on
income distribution. Its one departure from conventional theory is to assume that relative
endowment differences in the world are too large to allow for factor price equalization, And it has
demonstrated that once this premise is allowed, it is necessary to make a radical revision in the
conventional view of the impact of trade liberalization on income distribution.
It is conventional to argue that if a country is labor abundant relative to the global
economy, then trade liberalization will redistribute income toward labor. However in our
framework, such a conclusion is without foundation. The relevant factor abundance comparison is
not to the global economy, but relative to the cone within which one produces. Thus a country
that is very labor abundant relative to the global economy, but capital abundant relative to its own
cone, will find that trade liberalization reduces wages. Parallel results emerge in a model with a
larger number of productive factors.
As Learner andLevinsohn(1995) point out, there is currently no empirical work
identifying international production cones. In our framework, it follows that virtually all assertions
with respect to the anticipated distributional consequences of trade liberalization are without
foundation. We hope that this theoretical result will stimulate empirical work to identi~ these
cones, and so to identi~ the expected distributional effects of trade liberalization.
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